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Abstract
Over the last decade the interest in the quality of EU legislative instruments
has surged due to serious threats to the effectiveness of the legislation. This
contribution makes an inventory of the policies and instruments that have
been put into place to improve quality of legislation and assesses their
character, orientation and effectiveness. Any appraisal of these policies, so
the paper argues, is dependent on a perception of the basic functions
attributed to EU legislative instruments and the standards derived from it.
The paper concludes that the present policies and instruments for Better
lawmaking have the ability to promote regulatory quality, but not necessarily
overall legislative quality.
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1 Introduction
Debates on the quality of Community – or EU1 – legislation have, in the
wake of similar debates in EU Member States,2 become ever more topical in
the last decade. Various reasons may account for this rising interest, for
instance the increased volume and tempo of EU legislation accompanying
the establishment of the single market and the accession of twelve new
member states. The growing awareness of detrimental effects (non-
compliance, ineffectiveness, market distortions)3 of poor EU legislation have
also contributed to a sense of urgency to improve legislation among EU
institutions and member states alike.4 On top of that, more critical attitudes
in member states regarding the EU and EU policies, and problems pertaining
to the legitimacy of EU legislation, have spurred the debate, as have the
worldwide focus on better regulation and new insights in the effects of
regulation on economic growth.
For more than a decade now the EU has been trying to get to grips
1 ‘EU-legislation’ is the common terminology to indicate all of the legislation
enacted under both the EC- and EU-Treaty. Especially texts stemming from the
period before 2002 (still) use the term ‘Community legislation’ which basically
refers to legislation enacted under the EU’s first pillar (EC Treaty). In our
contribution we will use the terms ‘Community Legislation’ and ‘EU Legislation’
almost indiscriminately, for purposes of readability. Most texts on the quality of
legislation typically address Community legislation. Once the Reform Treaty of
2007 (Lisbon Treaty) is ratified and entered into force only ‘EU legislation’ survives
as the proper indication. After the Irish ‘no’ of 13 June 2008, however, it remains to
be seen whether the Lisbon Treaty will survive.
2 Better regulation is spreading like bushfire in Europe the past few years. See for a
few examples the UK (Better regulation and its Better regulation policy
<http://www.dti.gov.uk/bbf/better-regulation/index.html>), Germany (the establish -
ment of the National ‘Normenkontrollrat’ to promote Better regulation and cutting
red tape <http://www.normenkontrollrat.bund.de/Webs/NKR/DE/Homepage /home.
html>), Portugal (the Simplex 2007 and 2008-programs <http://www.
portugal.gov.pt/portal/PT/Governos/Governos_Constitucionais/GC17/Ministerios/
PCM/MEAI/Comunicacao/Programas_e_Dossiers/20060327_MEAI_Prog_Simplex.
htm>), Ireland (<http://www.betterregulation.ie/index.asp>), the Netherlands and
other countries (see also <www.administrative-burdens.com>).
3 See for a treatise on this subject C. Radaelli, ‘Governing European Regulation: The
Challenges Ahead’ (Florence: European University Institute 1998) RSC Policy
Paper No 98/3. < http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/WP-Texts/RSCPP98_03.html> (last
visited 4 January 2008).
4 See for instance the White Paper on European Governance COM (2001) 428 final,
the EU Commission’s Action Plan on Better lawmaking COM (2002) 275 final, and
(more or less) its follow up, A strategic review of Better regulation in the European
Union (Common Better regulation Strategy, for short) launched in a Commission
communication of 14 November 2006 COM (2006) 689.
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with legislative problems. Especially over the last five years the law making
institutions of the EU have committed themselves to a series of policies,
protocols, instruments and review methods to improve the overall quality of
legislation. The mass and intensity of these quality strategies is remarkable.
They provide an interesting focal point for research for a variety of reasons.
Firstly, they tell us something about the current state of affairs of the overall
governance of the EU, a treaty-based union that uses legislative instruments
to further its goals. What kind of instruments are used to attain the EU’s
objectives, why and to what effect? What works and what does not, and what
are the side effects? Secondly – more interesting from a scholarly point of
view – the quality strategies themselves may tell us something about shifts in
the perception of EU legislation and, following from that, the standards it
has to meet. This is basically a constitutional matter. If we ask ourselves
what ‘good’ EU legislation is, or what kind of standards EU legislative
instruments have to meet, than any answer to that question reflects notions,
mostly constitutional, about what we expect from EU legislation, more in
particular the functions we attribute to it.5 These notions vary widely and the
standards accordingly.
If, for instance, we find that the most fundamental function of
legislation is to enable institutions to intervene in markets, social or political
life (instrumental function),6 then the standard to measure the success or
5 See L.A.J. Senden, ‘The Quality of European Legislation and Its Implementation
and Application in the National Legal Order’ in E.M.H. Hirsch Ballin and L.A.J.
Senden (eds.) Co-actorship in the Development of European Law-making (The
Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press 2005) 29.
6 The instrumental functions of legislation in modern societies are manifold.
Summers distinguishes five common techniques to give effect to government
policies using the law as an instrument. To further policy or political ends law is
commonly used as: a. a grievance remedial instrument (recognition of claims to
enforceable remedies for grievances, actual or threatened); b. penal instrument
(prohibition, prosecution and punishment of bad conduct); c. an administrative-
regulatory instrument (regulation of generally wholesome activities, business or
otherwise); d. an instrument for ordering governmental/authoritative conferral of
public benefits (education, welfare, economic infrastructure, etc.); e. as an
instrument for facilitating and effectuating private arrangements (facilitation and
protection of private voluntary arrangements, economic and otherwise). EU
legislation - especially EC legislative instruments – basically perform most of these
instrumental functions, be it that the administrative-regulatory function (e.g. in
agriculture, health and environment legislation) and facilitating and effectuating
private arrangements (e.g. consumer protection, telecommunication services etc.)
functions are somewhat predominant. See R.S. Summers, ‘The Technique Element
in Law’ (1971), 59 California Law Review 733 see especially at 736. The functions
are inspired on an article by H. Kelsen, ‘The Law as a Specific Social Technique;
the Essence of Legal Technique’ (1941-1942) 9 The University of Chicago Law
Review 75 at 75.
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failure of legislation is an altogether different one than according to notions
that frame the principle functions of legislation in terms of establishment of
institutions, attribution of power and constraints on governmental action
(constitutional function). It does not stop there; legislation in modern states
performs a host of other functions.7 It expresses and fixes trade-offs between
(opposing) interests in political arenas (political function); it provides the
basis for popular participation – and so the legitimization – in the framing of
legislation (democratic function); it communicates and reaffirms public
morals, values and public goods (symbolic function);8 and it organizes and
structures implementing powers and institutions (bureaucratic function),9 to
name but a few of the most important functions. I will not deal with all of
these functions at length, but it is important to see that quality notions are in
fact implicit (most of the time) expressions of perceptions of the proper
functions of legislation.
To complicate matters: the functions of EC legislation are not static.
They have changed quite substantially over the years. Under the ‘old’ EEC
Treaty the EC’s legislative instruments were means to very specific ends:
establishing a customs union, achieving a common market, safeguarding
economic freedoms.10 Under the Treaty establishing the EU, the Union’s
objectives have changed and, as a result, the way in which legislative
instruments are used.11 The way in which the bulk of EU legislative
instruments is enacted nowadays, involving the European Parliament as a
full legislative partner under the co-decision procedure, has left its mark on
the character of EU legislation as well.
7 These functions in fact are a summary of the – Llewellyn-based (from his
Jurisprudence (1962)) – basic functions Twining and Miers attribute to ‘rules’. See
W. Twining and D. Miers, How to Do Things with Rules? (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson 1991, 3rd ed.) paragraphs 3.8 through 3.11 at 159.
8 This coincides to some extent with what Morgan labels ‘meta-regulation’. B.
Morgan, Social Citizenship in the shadow of Competition; the Bureaucratic Politics
of Regulatory Justification (Aldershot: Ashgate 2003) at 79.
9 This in fact is more or less a subsection of the ‘constitutional function’. The
constitutional function is commonly believed to be made up of the constituent,
institutional function (establishing institutions), the attributive function (attributing
power to institutions) and the regulatory function (outlining and limiting the scope
of the use of power). See for instance C.A.J.M. Kortmann, (in Dutch)
Constitutioneel recht (Constitutional Law) (Deventer: Kluwer 2008, 6th ed.) at 21.
10 See the preamble of the EEC Treaty and articles 2 and 3.
11 See for the different objectives article 2 of the Treaty establishing the European
Union (TEU). The objectives of the Union can be summarized as follows: promotion
of economic and social progress and a high level of employment to achieve balanced
and sustainable development, implementation of a common foreign and security
policy, establishment of citizenship of the EU, and providing for a area of freedom,
security and justice.
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These underlying notions as to the functions attributed to legislation
are vital to any understanding of the EU’s legislative policies. If we fail to
take account of them, it will be impossible to understand where the standards
for good legislation – on which most of the strategies are built – originate
from, nor will it be possible to come up with a balanced appraisal of the
effectiveness of these strategies.
It is therefore that in this contribution we will ask ourselves two
basic questions:
1. What kind notions of and standards for EU legislation are expressed in
recent policies and instruments aiming to improve the quality of EU
legislation?
2. Are these policies and instrument effective means to solve legislative
problems?
I will not, with this distinctive approach, address the questions
primarily from a regulatory governance perspective (why regulate, who are
the principle actors, what interest are served, etc.)12 but rather from a more or
less constitutional perspective (what are the basic functions attributed to
legislation, what kind of standards for ‘good’ legislation emanate from that,
how are these standards reflected in policies and enshrined in normative
documents, and how and to what degree are these standards met, etc.). 13
2 The quality of legislation: an elusive concept
Over the past decade, the concern for legislative quality and focus on better
regulation has become popular in many EU countries for various reasons.14
There is some evidence that legislation can and does affect competitiveness
12 See (from the vast lakes of literature on regulatory governance) for instance, A.
Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Oxford: Oxford University
Press 1994); R. Baldwin and M. Cave, Understanding Regulation (Oxford: Oxford
University Press 1999).
13 This latter approach was also adopted by H. Xanthaki, ‘The Problem of Quality in
EU Legislation; What on Earth is Really Wrong?’ (2001) 38 Common Market Law
Review 651.
14 The work of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) has been an important inspiration as well the successes of other EU
countries like the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Belgium in freeing markets
and limiting administrative and other burdens as a result of legislation. Or may be it
is due to the fact that no one in all seriousness can oppose Better regulation. Who on
earth would want to promote ‘Worse legislation’? See S. Weatherill, ‘The Challenge
of Better regulation’ in S. Weatherill (ed.) Better regulation (Oxford, Oregon and
Portland: Hart Publishing 2007) 3.
64 Erasmus Law Review [Volume 02 Issue 01
and economic growth15 and there are troubling problems regarding the
effectiveness of legislation. As a result, better regulation policies have
mushroomed throughout Europe and up to the level of the European Union.16
What many of these policies share, as does EU policy on Better
Lawmaking,17 is the ambition to improve the overall quality of legislation.
But what do we mean by legislative ‘quality’? It is a very elusive buzzword
indeed. According to a common definition, quality is the extent to which
goods or services meet requirements or standards.18 Hence legislative quality
is the degree to which legislative instruments and procedures live up to the
legislative standards. But then a new question emerges: what are the relevant
or proper standards for EU legislation? A question like this can only be
answered in the light of the function EU legislation performs in EU context.
3 Legislation as the source of quality standards
Legislation is primarily a medium through which law is expressed. As such
it performs important functions in constitutional states, as we have already
seen. In the political systems of welfare states, governed by the rule of law,19
legislation provides both the basis and the framework for government action
(constitutional function). At the same time, law expressed by legislation
serves as an instrument to further policies (instrumental function), acts as a
trade-off mechanism for interests (political function) and a channel for
popular participation in the enactment of law (democratic function), and it
offers the basic framework for the operation of a bureaucracy (bureaucratic
function).20 Aside from these more or less instrumental functions, legislation
has less well known but important non-instrumental expressive and symbolic
functions, which structure the legislative debate and provide the authoritative
aura for and legitimacy of legislation (symbolic function).21
15 See for instance Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Cutting Red Tape: Comparing Administrative Burdens across Countries (Paris:
OECD Publishing 2007).
16 See for instance the overview for simplification initiatives see <www.
administrative-burdens.com> (last visited 16 June 2008).
17 See <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/legal_service/law_making_en.htm> (last visited 16
June 2008).
18 See for instance the ISO 9000-definition of quality of the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO).
19 An important – procedural - element of the rule of law is that it requires a mandate
in law for governmental action and the obligation to act in accordance with law.
20 See P. Eijlander and W. Voermans, Wetgevingsleer (On Legislative Drafting).
(The Hague: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2000) at 18.
21 The communicative function of law (and legislation, as it expression, for that
matter) is, as observed by the Dutch scholar Wibren van der Burg, a complex one.
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By and large, the EU’s legislative instruments perform the same
functions in the context of the EU legal order, but there are some differences
compared to the situation in national states. Article 249 of the EC Treaty, for
instance, provides that EU institutions can only enact legislation ‘in order to
carry out their task and in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty’.22
On the face of it, this anchors the use of legislative instruments, like
regulations and directives, to the objectives of the EU, notably the promotion
of economic and social progress in a single market, the establishment of a
common foreign and security policy, EU citizenship, and an area of freedom,
security and justice.23 Although the scope of the objectives has broadened
since EEC became EC, even under the EU umbrella, article 249 of the EC
Treaty seems to indicate that the rationale for EC legislation is totally
different from the one in the member states. Historically this holds true. The
EU was not set up as a plenipotentiary state, but as a community with
specific, limited powers devised to achieve limited ends. As a consequence,
the functions of legislative instruments put in place by this community are
predominantly instrumental and bureaucratic, and should be appreciated
accordingly, one could argue. This way of reasoning, however, ignores that
the changes in the context in which the EU’s legislative instruments have
been used since the mid-1990s. Barents, for one, believes that the EU can no
longer be deemed a mere intergovernmental community, since it has
developed into a – originally self proclaimed – autonomous legal order
governed by constitutional principles (adherence to democracy, fundamental
rights, etc.).24 Article 6 of the Treaty establishing the European Union (TEU)
bears witness to this by stating that
The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common
to the Member States.
This is especially relevant for the use of legislative instruments in the EU.
These instruments are no longer a mere means to economic ends that must
Law may create a normative framework, a vocabulary to structure normative
discussions, as well as institutions and procedures that promote further discussion.
The expressive function of law is at stake when it expresses which fundamental
standards, which values are regarded as important. See W. Van der Burg, ‘The
Expressive and Communicative Functions of Law, Especially with Regard to Moral
Issues’ (2001) 20 Journal of Law and Philosophy 1 31. See also B. Z. Tamanaha,
Law as Means to an End; Threat to the Rule of Law. (New York: Cambridge
University Press 2006).
22 A limited power. See also article 5 TEU.
23 See article 2 TEU.
24 R. Barents, The Autonomy of Community Law (The Hague, London, New York:.
Kluwer Law International 2004) especially at 19.
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primarily be appreciated functionally, but instruments that perform vital
functions in an autonomous legal order, governed by constitutional
principles. EU legislation therefore basically serves the same ends and
purposes as national legislation, although there are different accents. But it
goes almost without saying that present-day EU legislation has a significant
democratic,25 political, constitutional and symbolic function, making it much
more comparable to member state legislation than it used to be.
4 Legislative and regulatory quality
In order to be able to perform most of the functions mentioned above,
legislation in a constitutional state as well as EU legislation must meet some
basic requirements. Subject to the rule of law, as any other institution or
agent in a constitutional state or the EU for that matter, the activity of
legislating is subject to the law itself. This means that in order to legislate, a
constitutional power to legislate is a prerequisite, and that legislative
processes as well as legislative discretion are confined by law (preparation
and enactment according to the due procedure, not acting contrary to higher
ranking laws, and some form of accommodation to existing law). Aside from
this ‘principle of legality’ the rule of law also imposes a duty on the
legislator to consider – in some way or respect – the implementation and
enforcement of legislation to be enacted (‘principle of effectiveness’). The
last requirement the rule of law sets upon a legislative act results from the
principle of legal certainty, and is what we can call the ‘principle of
intelligibility’, the principle that legislative acts need to some extent to be
readable and intelligible to its addressees. Most constitutional states are not
only governed by the rule of law but are in effect democratic states too. The
latter feature results in separate, additional requirements for legislatures
connected to the democratic and political function of legislation. Legislative
authorities are subject to the ‘duty to give reasons’, the ‘duty to consult or
involve interested parties’, be it directly or indirectly, and the ‘duty to
inform’ (transparency and accessibility), during the course of legislative
processes resulting in primary legislation.26
For some it will be obvious that legislative quality standards can
only emanate from constitutional principles (e.g. constitutional lawyers),
25 Especially now the co-decision procedure, involving the European Parliament, is
applicable in most of the first pillar legislation and will be the regular legislative
procedure under the Lisbon Treaty.
26 ‘Primary’ used here as opposed to ‘subordinate’ or ‘delegated’ legislation, in the
form of statutory instruments, government decrees or ministerial regulations that are
based on higher ranking regulations and merely detail the norms of the higher
ranking laws.
2009] Concern about the quality of EU legistlation 67
others may take a different view of the matter. The Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), for instance, approaches
the idea of – what they call - regulatory quality from a rather more economic
angle. The overall OECD perception of regulatory activity – often taking the
form of legislation – is largely instrumental. The OECD and a large part of
the regulatory governance community27 understand legislation primarily as a
regulatory instrument, as a means to attain public good, and to provide
prerequisites for stable institutions, fair market conditions, citizen’s
satisfaction, and economic growth and welfare.28 Taken from this per-
spective legislation performs well if it maximises the net benefits of
regulatory measures and citizen’s wealth. Legislative quality, according this
view, is not in the first place the extent to which legislation complies with
constitutional principles or conveys symbolic notions, but rather more the
way legislation rates in terms of enhancing economic performance, or the
dynamics of trade offs of interests. Over the last decade much effort has
been invested in defining (a wide range of) regulatory quality indicators, in
order to make regulatory quality measurable. Performance on indicators like
these gives us an idea of the ability of a government to formulate and
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private
sector development.29
The different functions of legislation translate into different views on
legislation. When one adopts an instrumental or political view to legislation
the conceptual lens to problems of and the proper standards for legislation
will be a different one than from a more constitutional or symbolic
perspective. That is why we will distinguish between the concept of
‘legislative quality’ and the concept ‘regulatory quality’. From a
constitutional point of view (and the symbolic function which is closely
related to it) the only right measure for the quality of legislation is its ability
express law.30 The quality of legislation is the extent to which the criteria,
27 Regulatory governance is topical in political science and the literature is
developing rapidly. The European Policy Group for political research has an active
standing group on regulatory governance. See <http://regulation.upf.edu/> (last
visited on 19 June 2008). It is quite strange that scholars in constitutional law are not
catching on: a state’s regulatory capacity is the core business of constitutional law.
28 See OECD, Regulatory Policies in OECD Countries; from Interventionism to
Regulatory Governance. (Paris: OECD Publishing 2002).
29 See the paper D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, Governance Matters VI:
Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996–2006 (2007) World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper No. 4280. See also Centre for European Studies
Bradford University, Final Report on Inddicators of Regulatory Quality, report for
DG Enterprise (European Commission 2004).
30 See also J. Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1999) especially Chapter 2 - The Indignity of Legislation. See also
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emanating from constitutional principles, are met. Regulatory quality on the
other hand is the extent to which legislation, as a means to express public
policies, is successful in implementing policies to permit and promote
private sector development, fair market conditions, stable institutions,
citizens’ satisfaction, etc. The different notions are not mutually exclusive;
in fact they coincide in some respects. One might, for instance, argue that the
regulatory quality of legislation is a part of an overall notion of legislative
quality, since it deals with effectiveness and efficiency of legislation. This
would not, however, do justice to the very different perspectives on the
function of legislation in the two different notions.
However interesting this discussion is, this paper does not take
regulatory quality as its principle point of departure, but legislative quality
instead. Not that I wish to disqualify the regulatory quality perspective, but
in an attempt to add to it by taking a more constitutional point of view, one
that has, in my opinion, not been fully explored and expressed in recent
Better regulation debates.
5 Quality standards for EU legislation
The legislative requirements mentioned in paragraph 4 are still very general
and theoretical, even though they are represented in quality policies of
different member states.31 If we want to find out what kind notions of and
standards for EU legislation are expressed in recent quality policies we need
to take a closer look to these policies themselves and the debates and
considerations preceding them.
The idea to improve the quality of EU legislation is quite new. In the
rush to complete the internal market, not much attention was given to the
quality of legislative instruments. It did not sting up until 1990: the
legislative volume of the EU had been quite modest up to that moment and
legislative problems were dismissed as either ‘collateral damage’ or
C. M. Radaelli and F. de Francesco, Regulatory Quality in Europe: Concepts,
Measures and Policy Processes (Manchester: Manchester University Press 2007).
31 See for instance the Netherlands. The idea of legislative quality is closely related
to the demands of the rule of law and demands of – so called - administrative quality
of legislation. See inter alia, the legislative policy document ‘Outlooks for
Legislation’ (Zicht op wetgeving – Dutch Parliamentary Papers (Kamerstukken II)
1990/91, 22 008, nos 1-2). Quality of legislation in the Netherlands is perceived as
the degree to which a regulation complies with the requirements (so-called ‘quality
pairs’) of: a. legality and lawfulness, b. implementation and enforcement, c.
effectiveness and efficiency, d. subsidiarity and proportionality, e. harmonization
and coordination and f. simplicity, readability and accessibility. These requirements
are elaborated in policies and dedicated instruments, like reviews, manuals and
(voluminous) drafting directives.
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perceptions that did not duly account for the different setting32 of EU
legislation. After the Sutherland report sounded the alarm over the quality of
EC legislation in 1992,33 however, the debate was on, not only on the
problems but on the proper standards for EU legislation as well. This does -
to my mind - not accidentally coincide with the emergence of the new
political and constitutional objectives the EU has set itself since the
Maastricht Treaty. These new objectives bear on the expectations of EC
legislation.
5.1 Sutherland, Koopmans, Piris and Timmermans
Since 1992 most commentators, scholars and policy makers have felt that the
proper quality standards for European legislation are to be found in the
Treaties and the objectives pursued in a Community context with the
existing legislative instruments. At the conference ‘Quality of European and
national regulations in the internal market’, held in Scheveningen in April
1997,34 both the Director-General of the Council Legal Service, J-C Piris,
and the deputy Director-General of the European Commission Legal
Service, C. Timmermans, indicated what the term quality of European
32 Some authors argue that the EU legal order and national legal orders are in fact
incomparable as regards legislation and legislative processes. Legislation at the EU
level performs different functions than in the Member States and the setting of EU
legislative processes is unique. Timmermans – for instance - notes that the nature of
Community Law is a ‘droit diplomatique’, a product of intergovernmental
negotiation that can only be judged on its own merits and is governed by its own
standards. C.W.A. Timmermans, ‘How to improve the Quality of Community
Legislation: the Viewpoint of the European Commission’, in A.E. Kellerman and
others (eds.) Improving the Quality of Legislation in Europe (The Hague, Boston,
London: Asser Press 1998) 39. This idea of incomparability seems to have caught
on, especially in the Netherlands (see Hirsch Ballin and Senden, above n. 5 at 29).
33 The Sutherland report (‘The internal market after 1992: meeting the challenge’)
of 1992 SEC (1992) 2044 sets out some basic requirements for EC legislation,
holding that each Community legislative act should be assessed on the basis of five
criteria, namely the need for action, the choice of the most effective course of action,
proportionality of the measure, consistency with existing measures, and wider
consultation of the circles concerned during the preparatory stages. See for the
follow up of the report, inter alia, the European Commission’s Communication SEC
(1992) 2277 and COM (1993) 361 def.
34 For a summary of the contents of this meeting (‘Kwaliteit van Europese en
nationale regelgeving in de interne markt’) see H. Hijmans, ‘Over de kwaliteit van
Europese regelgeving’ (On the quality of European Legislation) (1997) 5 Regelmaat
(Dutch Journal for Legislative Studies) at 192.
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regulation must be taken to mean in a Community context in their view.35
Building upon the work of the Sutherland report of 1992 and the Koopmans
working group,36 these EU officials came up with an impressive shopping
list of quality standards for EU legislation.37 Although shopping lists are not
all that interesting per se, what is interesting to see is that the list of EU
quality standards corresponds to a very high degree to the general
observations set out in paragraph 4. The shopping lists express, to a certain
extent, a somewhat constitutional view on EC legislation where one would
expect a primarily instrumental view. There are also specific features and
differences. The EU quality standards set out by Piris and Timmermans
emphasise the demands of subsidiarity and proportionality (concurrent with
the requirement of article 5 of the EC Treaty), and the right choice of
instrument (and the accompanying procedure). The latter element is a typical
consequence of the system of conferral or limited attribution under the EC
35 See J.-C Piris, ‘The Quality of Community Legislation: the Viewpoint of the
Council’s Legal Service’ in A.E. Kellerman and others (eds.) above n. 32 at 25 and
Timmermans, above n. 32.
36 In the wake of the alarms raised by the report of the Molitor group (Report of the
Group of Independent Experts on Simplification of Legislation and Administration,
COM (1995) 288 final/2, of 21 June 1995) the Dutch presidency of the EU in 1996
commissioned a working group to try and find more or less universal standards for
legislation. The Koopmans-group came up with a set of standards that are derived
from (or inspired) by the common legal cultures from the - then - 10 EU Member
States. Koopmans Report, ‘The quality of EC Legislation. Points for Consideration
and Proposals’ (The Hague 1995).
37 According to approximation of these ‘legislative chiefs’ in 1997 EU legislation
must meet with the following demands: 1. Necessity of regulation (alternatives to
regulation are to be considered); 2. Proportionality (no more burdening than
absolutely necessary); 3. Subsidiarity (in line with the subsidiarity principle laid
down in article 5 of the EC Treaty); 4. Choice of the right instrument (directive,
regulation, etc.); 5. Control over the volume of legislation, by preventing new
regulation, excessive costs, red tape and overregulation; 6. Coherence and
harmonization with existing measures; 7. Requirement of due care during
preparation, in the sense of prior consultation of interested parties; 8.
Implementation and enforcement; 9. Drafting quality, in particular compliance with
Community requirements enshrined in manuals and style guides. At the time (1997)
these were the Commission’s and Council’s Drafting manuals, style guides and the
requirements following from the Sutherland-report. In 1998 a lot of these drafting
requirements were forged and enshrined into the Interinstitutional Agreement of 22
December 1998 on common guidelines for the quality of drafting of Community
legislation (OJ 1999C73/1) (hereinafter IIA 1998) and 10. Accessibility (inter alia,
in the sense of providing easy access to, consolidation and codification of regulatory
texts). Points 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7 were also put forward as requirements for EC
legislation in the 1993 Sutherland report. See Commission Communication of 16
December 1993 COM (1993) 361 def.
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and EU Treaties.
5.2 EU Quality standards
In the following years these sketchy notions on quality standards from the
1997 conference were elaborated in policy papers and policies, notably in
the white paper on European Governance38 and conclusions of the Laeken
and Lisbon summits. They underpin the present EU legislative policies.
Their echo also resonates in the work of the Mandelkern group,39 the Better
lawmaking initiatives and instruments of 200240 and the subsequent Better
regulation strategy of 2006.41 If we were to sum up the net result of these
documents, the EU standards for legislative quality would boil down to the
following requirements to be met when drafting, enacting and implementing
legislative acts.
i. Legality: the limits of the legislative attribution of the EC Treaty and
EU Treaty, sufficient legal basis, not contravening superior or
already existing legislation or treaties – including the EC and EU
Treaty - with due regard for unwritten legal principles, etc.42
ii. Due procedure and consultation: proper procedure, coordination
(information exchange, cooperation, synchronization, etc.) between
the three legislative institutions (Commission, Council and European
Parliament),43 (multi)annual programming of legislative activity,
wide consultation,44 evidence-based and duly motivated decisions,45
transparency throughout the legislative process enabling maximum
accessibility, etc.46
iii. Subsidiarity and proportionality (including overall effectiveness and
efficiency of an act): careful consideration of necessity of
Community action47 in view of the subsidiarity principle,48
38 COM (2001) 428 final.
39 See Mandelkern Group on Better regulation, Final Report (2001).
40 Communication Better lawmaking COM (2002) 275 final, followed by the Action
Plan for simplifying and improving the regulatory environment COM (2002) 278
final.
41 COM (2006) 689 final.
42 See for instance point 2 Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making of 31
December 2003, OJ 2003C321/01 (hereinafter: IIA 2003).
43 See points IIA 3 through 11 of the IIA 2003.
44 See point 26 IIA 2003.
45 See point 15 IIA 2003.
46 Se points 4 through 9, 10 and 11 of the IIA 2003.
47 See points 16 and 17 of the IIA 2003 (elaborated in point 18 through 23).
48 See article 5 of the EC Treaty, the of 25 October 1993 on the procedures for
implementing the principle of subsidiarity OJ C 329/135, points 13, 16 and 18
through 23 of the IIA 2003.
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prevention of legislative proliferation, due regard for alternative
methods of regulation,49 avoiding red tape where possible,
instruments and costs proportional to the policy goals and as simple
as possible,50 consideration of effectiveness of the solution in
comparison to alternatives, informed and evidence-based decision-
making e.g. on the basis of an integrated impact assessment,51
screening the legislative stock from time to time, simplification
(inter alia by repeal of obsolete acts), codification and
consolidation,52 etc.
iv. The right instrument: choosing the right instrument (directive,
framework directive, regulation, etc.), the right balance between
general principles and detailed provisions, no excessive use of
implementing powers, etc.53
v. Implementation and transposition: attention to the operability and
application of an act,54 careful consideration of implementation
powers for the Commission and the Member States, clear
transposition deadlines for directives, consideration of transitory
provisions and entry into force, monitoring implementation and
evaluation, etc.55
vi. Enforceability: due consideration of the enforcement and assessment
of compliance, effective inspection and sanctioning.56
vii. Technical quality (including accessibility and readability): clear,
simple and precise language, due attention to internal and external
consistency, consideration of the multilingual context of the EU,
overall accessibility and readability.57
Lists like these always have an element of subjectivity58 and this one
certainly cannot claim to be exhaustive or the ultimate one. Some may feel
that elements of the list should be joined or – on the contrary – should be
split. Others will argue that the list is quite technical and administrative in
nature and does not take full account of the political, social or economical
49 See point 16 IIA 2003.
50 See e.g. point 12 IIA 2003.
51 See points 27, 28 and 29 of the IIA 2003.
52 These latter elements are at the heart of the Better regulation Strategy of 2006,
COM (2006) 689 final. See also points 35 and 36 of the IIA 2003.
53 See point 13 IIA 2003 and – somewhat remotely – point 2 of the IIA 1998.
54 See the Commission’s Communication Better Monitoring of the Application of
Community Law’ COM(2002)725 final/4.
55 See points 24 and 32-34 IIA 2003 and 20 and 21 IIA 1998.
56 See the Commission’s Communication a Europe of Results – Applying
Community Law COM(2007) 502 final.
57 See points 1 through 19 IIA 1998.
58 See Senden, above n. 5 at 29.
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dimensions of legislation. This may well all hold true, but the purpose of this
list of requirements is not to give any definitive answer, but foremost to
provide an aid to understanding the discussion on quality of EU legislation
and the proposed solutions, as well as to provide a guide through the dense
woods of EU policies aiming to improve on it. It we look at it from that
perspective, it is interesting to see that most of the quality standards voiced
in the debate reflect and emphasize the constitutional, democratic,
bureaucratic and instrumental functions of EU legislation. The quality
standards expressed do not seem to fit the picture of EU legislative
instruments as mere instruments of economic integration, which in fact is
somewhat strange because the EU’s objectives for the most part are.
6 Legislative problems
Legislative functions and standards derived from it are, as argued above,
conceptual lenses to legislative problems. Not all EU legislation is up to the
standards mentioned in the previous chapter, that much will be clear. But is
this a large problem, if a problem at all? The Dutch Minister of Employment
and Social Affairs in 2008, P. Donner, takes the view that the problem of
lacking quality of EU legislation is often overrated due to national bias in the
perception of quality. EU legislation needs to be judged on its own specific
accord and merits, and a more teleological approach of EU legislation is
called for, according to Donner.59 Senden and Hirsch Ballin too argue that
the notion of EU legislative problems to a large extent depends on the eye of
the beholder.60 Xanthaki, on the other hand, observes that the quality
problems of EU legislation are probably not very different or more troubling
than those of national legislation.61 We tend to agree with her, since – as we
have argued in paragraph 4 – the functions of EU legislative instruments
have changed over the last decade, making EU legislation (and its problems)
much more comparable to member state legislation than before.
Even if we allow for the fact that the discussion on the seriousness
of legislative problems may vary according to the angle chosen, one cannot
deny that EU legislation does on occasion come with quality defects. Such
defects – the failure to meet quality requirements – can have serious
consequences on different levels (individual, national, EU and international)
and ultimately lead to ineffectiveness of EU legislation and the policies
enshrined therein. Whatever relativist position one cares to take, a quality
defect that cripples or threatens to cripple the effect of EU legislation is by
59 See J.P.H. Donner, De kwaliteit van Europese regels (The Quality of European
Legislation) (2001) RegelMaat (Dutch Journal for Legislative Studies) 216.
60 See Senden and Hirsch Ballin, above n. 5.
61 See Xanthaki, above n. 13 at 651-652.
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all means a ‘true’ legislative problem.62
If we want to assess the effectiveness of quality enhancing policies
and instruments – as I have set out to do – we need to have some basic
understanding of the problems they are meant to solve. Problems facing EU
legislation have been researched and analysed over the last decade by
different expert, high level groups (e.g. Molitor group,63 Koopmans,64
Lamfalussy,65 Mandelkern66) academics and institutions,67 although far more
less detailed and systematically than one would expect in view of the
seriousness of the problems. Briefly summarized the gist of these reports
results in four categories of quality defects of EU legislation:
a. Qualitative defects as a result of the dynamics of EU legislative
processes. These problems become manifest in various forms, ranging from
insufficient consultation to a lack of ex post evaluation. At the heart of the
matter lies the problem that EU legislative processes – until recently68 – were
not cyclic and – thus – not self correcting, but rather one dimensionally
oriented at enactment, without due attention to the afterlife of legislation,
notably problems of interpretation, application, implementation and
62 In a 2001 contribution to RegelMaat I suggested to take the effectiveness test as a
method to decide whether or not a quality problem constitutes a serious legislative
problem. The test holds that if a quality problem results in a situation where
legislation cannot or no longer attain the objectives laid down by the legislative
authority it creates a legislative problem. W. Voermans, ‘Nieuwe wetgevings-
procedures onder en regelingsinstrumenten voor de EU?’ (New legislative
procedures and instruments for the EU?) (2001) RegelMaat (Dutch Journal for
Legislative Studies) 204.
63 See Molitor Group, above n. 36.
64 See Koopmans, above n. 36.
65 Committee of Wise Men on European Securities Regulation, Final Report of the
Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets (Brussels
2001).
66 Mandelkern Group on Better regulation, Final Report, above n. 39.
67 See inter alia Radaelli, above n. 3; Kellerman, above n. 32; V.J.J.M. Bekkers and
others, ‘The case of the Netherlands’, in S.A. Pappas (eds.) National Administrative
Procedures for the Preparation and Implementation of Community Decisions
(Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration 1995) 397; L. Marissing,
Vier rapporten inzake de kwaliteit van EG-regelgeving (Four Reports on the Quality
of EC Legislation) (1996) 4 SEW 124; N.E. Bracke, Voorwaarden voor goede EG-
wetgeving (Requirements for proper Community legislation), PhD-thesis
(Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam 1996); W. Voermans and others, Quality,
Implementation and Enforcement; a Study into the Quality of EU Legislation and its
impact on the implementation and enforcement within the Netherlands (The Hague,
Tilburg: Ministry of Justice, Tilburg University 2000).
68 In a recent Communication the EU Commission advocates increased attention to
aspects of implementation throughout the policy cycle COM (2007) 502 final.
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compliance.69 Because it is so difficult to achieve results and compromises,
and the pressure to meet the integration goals is high, EU legislative
processes tend to focus on direct, sometimes short term, results. Achieving
policy goals was until recently more or less synonym to getting policies
decided or legislation enacted. Problems of application, implementation,
enforcement and compliance did not head the priority list of the EU’s
legislative institutions. This has had five consequences.
i. Firstly, it has resulted in a lack of information on the overall
effectiveness of enacted EU legislation in terms of application,
implementation and enforcement. The EU legislative institutions
simply do not know half of what happens when EU legislation is
implemented, applied en enforced in the member states. Moreover,
the institutions do not always seem to be very keen to know either;
the overall sentiment seems to be that after enactment,
implementation is the member states’ business.
Information on what is actually happening after enactment,
though, is vital for EU legislative institutions’ ability to reconsider
and adjust their course. The problem is not that there isn’t any
information on the application of EU legislation, but that in many
cases it is not the information needed to assess the effectiveness of
directives or regulations, and that they are reported by a more or less
partisan organizations, i.e. the member states themselves.
Transposition notifications, scoreboards, reports on litigation under
EC legislation, the odd infringement procedure, will tell you only so
much about what is really happening in the post-enactment stages of
legislation. The EU by and large has a ‘paper implementation
culture’ meaning that implementation and application are mainly
monitored on the basis of abstract member state progress reports and
notifications. Information on the law in action is quite rare.
The lack of (the right) information shows whenever a policy
area is systematically evaluated. A 2004 evaluation of the Public
Procurement Directives 1992-2003 for instance revealed that less
than an estimated third of the public procurements complied with the
administrative procedures laid down in the procurement directives.70
This compliance deficit does not show from the monitoring data the
Commission keeps nor from its annual reports on application.
Sometimes even the central authorities of member states are not
aware of the ‘silent losses’ as regards interpretation and application
69 See Bekkers and others, above n. 67.
70 See Europe Economics, Evaluation of Public Procurement Directives (2004)
Markt/2004/10/D Final Report. The researchers admit that this percentage of non-
compliance can even be worse because they simply did not have all the necessary
information.
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of EU law.71 We simply do not know whether, and to what extent,
EU legislation is being complied with; judging by what is seeping
through, the outlook is not altogether promising.
ii. Secondly, from the little we know, we can deduct that the
compliance rate of EU legislation is probably rather low. In 1998
Radaelli concluded that poor performance in the implementation
stage is the Achilles heel of many European rules.72 His conclusion
still stands. In a communication of September 2007 the EU
Commission73 admits as much, but at the same time points out that it
is, in fact, the member states which have the primary responsibility
for the correct and timely application of EU treaties and legislation.
The EU Commission cannot go it alone when it comes to overseeing
and controlling the implementation. This divide in responsibilities
only seems to add to the problems of implementation. Chinese walls
seem to be cemented between the initial legislative stages and the
implementation phase. The Commission cannot be held accountable
for the implementation performance of the member states and lacks
the resources to effectively monitor and check it. Member states
themselves will not be all that motivated to review and verify their
implementation performance more rigorously than is strictly
required. In most cases only reports of on-time acts are required
(notifications of transposition or an implementation report, for
example). To do more than that is ill advised: overzealous
implementation can result in disadvantages for national economic
71 In our own research project in the year 2000 (Voermans and others, above n. 65 at
28) it turned out that ‘silent losses’ occur quite frequently because national
enforcement authorities, inspectors or administrative authorities simply cannot
resolve residual legislative problems of their own, nor can they report back. One
example is the provision on ‘serious offence’ in Directive 96/26/EC on the
admission to the occupation of road haulage operator and road passenger transport
operator and mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of
formal qualifications intended to facilitate for these operators the right to freedom of
establishment in national and international transport operations, amended by
Directive 98/76/EC OJ 1998 L 277/17. The directive holds that repeated – even
minor - offences of drivers against the transport rules leads to the revocation of the
license to practice as a road transport operator. This has the unforeseen and quite
dramatic consequence that big operators, with a large staff, run a much bigger risk of
losing their license than small operators. Obviously this was not the objective of the
directive, but what are the administrative authorities to do? They do what they
normally do: not apply the provision at all. This was but one example. We stumbled
upon many problems like these in the five, randomly picked, dossiers we studied in
our research.
72 See Radaelli above n. 3 at 6.
73 See A Europe of results – applying Community Law, above n. 56.
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operators. Add to this that underachievement in the actual
implementation of EC legislation is very difficult to bring to court,
let alone the Court of Justice, and one can discern a constitutional
flaw in the fabric of the EU legal order here. The system of checks
and balances pertaining to the responsibility for implementation of
EU legislation leaves much to be desired. The establishment of
European agencies74 and European networks that act as ‘ears and
eyes’ as regards implementation, is to be welcomed in this respect,
notwithstanding the need for a broader discussion on the institutional
setting of European agencies.75
iii. Thirdly, EU legislative processes lack an effective feedback culture.
After EU legislation is concluded it sometimes proves difficult for
authorities in member states to report back on interpretation,
application and implementation problems without incriminating
themselves and triggering an infringement procedure. The need for
feedback shows in the emergence of different networks of
implementation authorities over the years. A well-known network in
this respect is the European Union Network for the Implementation
and Enforcement of Environmental Law (IMPEL), an informal
network of the environmental authorities of the member states.76
iv. Fourthly, the efforts of legislative institution are not always well
coordinated, which results in inconsistencies and inefficiency.77
v. Finally, the lack of transparency of the legislative processes and the
idea that it cannot be influenced combine with the problems of
intelligibility of EU legislation.78
74 According to the Commission’s website a Community agency is a body governed
by European public law; it is distinct from the Community Institutions (Council,
Parliament, Commission, etc.) and has its own legal personality. It is set up by an act
of secondary legislation in order to accomplish a very specific technical, scientific or
managerial task, in the framework of the European Union’s “first pillar”. See
<http://europa.eu/agencies/index_en.htm> (last visited 8 January 2008).
75 See the recent communication of the European Commission European agencies –
The way forward COM (2008) 135 final.
76 The IMPEL network is both active and influential, especially since the European
Commission accepted the invitation to preside it. Since 1992 IMPEL has generated
almost 50 reports ranging from the Better Legislation initiative to the Reference
Book on Environmental Inspections. Informal and semi-informal networks like
IMPEL are mushrooming the five years. See P.C. Adriaanse and others,
Implementatie van EU-handhavingsvoorschriften (Implementation of EU control
and sanction provisions) (The Hague: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2008).
77 See the White Paper on European Governance, above n. 4.
78 See the findings of Working Group IX (D’Amato) on Simplification of the
European Convention CONV 424/02 (2002. The group held that the Union’s system
of lawmaking as we know it is not very clear or comprehensible to its citizens. The
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b. A second group of quality problems concerns legislative
proliferation (Normenflut) and defects in the use and abuse of EC regulatory
instruments in policy-making. The EC legislative file is often believed to be
too voluminous.79 Although the volume of EU legislation is perhaps not
large in itself compared with the stock of the member states, the excess of
detail and the resulting administrative burden (‘red tape’) can, however,
impede economic growth. Especially when EU legislation does not live up to
the subsidiarity principle this is undesirable. It was the Molitor Working
party that, in 1995, triggered an increased awareness of the detrimental
effects of EU legislation to economic growth. At this moment the volume of
legislation and the burdens it creates have become a prime political concern
throughout Europe and at EU level as well.80
A problem specific to EU legislation and its volume is the cost
involved in the translation of legislation.81 Even a simple decrease of the
number of pages of the legislative file will save a substantial sum of money.
Another problem is the use of legislative instruments. The EU harbours a
regulatory and legalistic approach to policy making82 and policy
implementation,83 which means that most policies are implemented by
legislative instruments. This drives legislative proliferation. A separate
problem is the abuse of legislative instruments, detailing directives to such
an extent that they are virtually regulations, with no room left for discretion
during transposition.84
c. A third group of quality problems consists of technical flaws of
ability to criticise the system is, however, a key factor of democracy. Citizens must
be able to understand the system so that they can identify its problems, criticise it,
and ultimately control it.
79 In 2001 the EU the total number of pages enshrining the ‘acquis communautaire’
was estimated at 80.000 pages, COM (2001) 645 final.
80 See for an interesting ‘debunking’ – though a bit partisan – comment on the often
unsubstantiated claim that economic growth is impeded by large volumes of
legislation, the report of the British Trade Union Conference (TUC), Unravelling the
red tape myths (2003) < http://www.tuc.org.uk/em_research/tuc-6257-f1.cfm#tuc-
6257-1> (last visited 6 January 2008).
81 The latest figure (2005) for the total annual cost of translations is € 1,123 million,
which is 1 per cent of the annual general budget of the European Union. Divided by
the population of the EU, this comes to € 2.28 per person per year.
82 Policy making is often equated with law-making. See L. Metcalfe, ‘Building
Capacities for Integration: The Future Role of the Commission’ (1996) 2 Eipascope
1.
83 See e.g. V.A. Schmidt, ‘Procedural Democracy in The EU: the Europeanization of
National and Sectoral Policymaking Processes’ (2006) 13 Journal of European
Public Policy 670.
84 See the Koopmans Report, above n. 36 at 15.
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legislative texts. It concerns problems such as the lack of readability and
comprehensibility of legislation due to vague or ambiguous language, the
use of unclear formulations and inconsistencies, and unnecessary
complexity.85 Legislation needs to be as simple, clear and precise as possible
to allow the public, interested parties and those responsible for
interpretation, enforcement and implementation, to understand and apply the
law. Poorly drafted legislation is not merely a nuisance, it can also result in
deficient86 application, enforcement and compliance problems, and unduly
restrictive interpretation.87
d. The last group of quality problems relates to the physical
accessibility (including availability) of EU legislation and the management
of the EC regulatory file.88 In this context, it mostly concerns problems
relating to the access to EU legislation, promulgation, codification and
consolidation of legislation.89 The EU legislative file used to be difficult to
access, due to the piecemeal way of enacting bits and parcels of legislation
on the same subject.
7 From Better Lawmaking to Better Regulation
The survey above demonstrates that EU legislative problems are by no
means ‘cosmetic’ nor merely artificial in the eyes of some member state
beholders. From what we know about the effects of EU legislation – which
is little, due to the lack of a committed evaluation culture – a troubling
picture emerges. Lack of legislative quality and the resulting problems seem
to threaten European integration on all levels, both economical and political.
85 See for instance the wording of the former paragraph 1 of article 19 of Regulation
820/97 EC which read: ‘A compulsory beef-labelling system shall be introduced
which shall be obligatory in all Member States from 1 January 2001 onwards.
However, this compulsory system shall not exclude the possibility for a Member
State to decide to apply the system merely on an optional basis to beef sold in that
same Member State.’
86 Divergent application in different Member States, for instance, can lead to
heterogeneous regimes and thus resist harmonization and level playing fields.
87 Point 1.3 of the Joint Practical Guide (2003) gives the example of the Case C-
6/89 ARD v. Pro Sieben 1999 ECR I-7599 where a foggy text, intended to resolve
problems in negotiating the provision, ultimately was interpreted by the Court of
Justice to the exact opposite of what was intended.
88 Admittedly a lot has improved since the arrival of EUR-LEX. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm (last visited 23 June 2008).
89 The problem of poor accessibility was signalled quite early on by the French
Council of State. See the Rapport Public of the Conseil d’Ėtat (1992), in particular
at 49.
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It is a problem that cannot be readily discarded.
This explains why the EU has adopted an increasingly activist
approach to the matter. Since the Edinburgh European Council, in 1992, the
need for Better lawmaking has been recognised and placed on the political
agenda.90 Although EU policies aiming to improve lawmaking are fairly
recent, three distinct periods can be distinguished since the outset in 1992.
The first period (1993-2002) was a period of humble beginnings. During this
period, Better Lawmaking was approached in a rather technical,
depoliticized way. The emphasis was on the improvement of the quality of
drafting and on attempts to simplify legislation. The second period (2002-
2006) is characterized by a more comprehensive approach to Better
Lawmaking, which was perceived as an integral part of good governance
and therefore required attention throughout the policy cycle. Elements of
effectiveness and efficiency of legislation came to the fore as key aspects of
consideration. Systematic use of impact assessment of legislative proposals,
transparency and openness of the legislative procedure (including wide
consultation) and programmatic simplification were added to the existing
core of quality policies. Compared with the first period, the approach of this
second period was more outward looking, with a keener interest in the
overall external effects of legislation. The third period (2006-present) builds
upon Better Lawmaking, but takes it one step further by mainstreaming the
so-called Better Rregulation strategy into the overall strategy of the Union.
Better Regulation ties in with the Lisbon strategy of 2000, which aims to
make Europe a competitive player in a globalised marketplace. Better
Regulation is therefore much more political and economically oriented. It
strives for a sort of ‘smart’91 use of legislation that minimizes costs and
maximizes benefits (increased productivity, employment, etc.).
7.1 1993-2002: Improving and simplifying drafting quality
After the Edinburgh Council, in 1992, the Council of Ministers adopted a
resolution on the quality of drafting of Community legislation.92 The set-up
of this resolution was modest93 and technical, and not binding for all
European legislative partners. In 1995 the Commission followed suit, with
90 Keleman and Menon feel that these first initiatives to simplify and to improve EC
legislation were a sort of ceremonial self-flagellation more or less to cloak the vast
amount of regulatory initiatives of the Delors’ Commission. See R.D. Keleman and
A. Menon, ‘The Politics of EC Regulation’ in S. Weatherill (ed.) Better Regulation
(Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing 2007) 183.
91 See R. Baldwin, ‘Is Better regulation Smarter Regulation?’ (2005) Public Law
485.
92 Council Resolution of 8 June 1993 on the quality of drafting of Community
legislation, OJ 1993 C 166, 17 June 1993 1.
93 The resolution consists of a mere ten points.
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an in-house legislative policy of its own.94 Like that of the Council, the
Commission’s resolution was principally aimed at improving the technical
quality of drafts, although somewhat more elaborately.
Further progress was made upon the conclusion of the Treaty of
Amsterdam in 1997. To the final act of the Treaty a declaration (no. 39) was
appended, calling upon the institutions to ‘establish by common accord
guidelines for improving the quality of the drafting of Community
legislation.’95
This declaration, in turn, was followed by the Interinstitutional
Agreement 1998 on common guidelines for the quality of drafting of
Community legislation (IIA 1998).96 This agreement binds all institutions
involved in the enactment of Community legislation. The IIA stresses that
the quality of drafting is a joint responsibility of the EU institutions involved
in Community legislation.97
The Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA 1998) for the most part
includes technical requirements and considerations pertaining to the quality
of EU legislation (in sum 22 guidelines). They are supplemented by eight
implementation measures.
Especially if we consider the fact that a comprehensive comparative
analysis of all of the legislative drafting directions in the member states and
an in-depth study into the case law of the EC Court of Justice were
conducted as an inspiration for the IIA 1998, a harvest of 22 technical
guidelines seems rather modest. The IIA 1998 includes hardly any points
related to the implementation or enforcement of Community law, but focuses
strictly on the technical aspects of drafting. However, compared to the
former – very broad – Council resolution of June 1993, it is a step forward in
terms of both content and its binding character. The IIA is binding for all
three of the legislating European institutions: the Council, the European
Parliament and the Commission.
The implementation of the IIA is proving to be a long haul. In 2001,
Xanthaki observed that drafting rules, including the IIA, still were applied
very poorly. That could, in her view, partly account for bad legislation. We
however do not feel that meeting the standards of good drafting from
drafting manuals or the IIA 1998 is a purpose in itself. Meeting them will
certainly not safeguard against bad legislation. Drafting directives are tools
to improve aspects of drafting by a ‘dedicated dialogue’. The ultimate goal
of the IIA and drafting instruments is to raise awareness for the quality of
94 EU Commission, General guidelines for legislative policy, SEC (1995) 2255/7, 18
January 1996.
95 OJ 1997 C 340 at 139.
96 The IIA 1998 was adopted on 22 December 1998, OJ 1999 C 73/1.
97 See also See EC Commission, Better lawmaking 1998: a shared responsibility,
COM (1998) 715 final, dated 1 December 1998.
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legislative texts, to spark discussions on the quality of Community
legislation, to give a voice and place to the aspect of quality in the drafting
process, and ultimately to promote a culture of due care for technical quality.
It is questionable whether this is catching on. Never in the past ten years has
a reference been made to the IIA 1998 in parliamentary questions, rarely in
case law,98 and only twice in an opinion of the Commission.99
Is must be noted that the IIA 1998 was never intended to be the final
stage, but merely a step towards systematically drawing more attention to the
drafting quality of Community legislation. The implementation measures
attached to it voice this character of a continuous process. The measures
provide, inter alia, for a further cooperation between member states and
institutions, with a view to better understand the aspects to be considered
when drafting, and to foster both the creation of drafting units and the
drawing-up of a joint practical guide. This Joint Practical Guide, replete with
best practices and illustrations, was published in 2003. It has proved to be a
very practical tool indeed.100
After the report of the Molitor working party (1995) the European
Commission decided to subject some sectors of the internal market to a
critical review, with the assistance of the member states, the corporate sector
and consumers. The so-called SLIM exercise (Simpler Legislation Internal
Market) may be regarded as an element in the follow-up to the Molitor
report. The European Commission proposed to have four sectors of the
internal market examined by four SLIM teams. These SLIM projects were
intended to assess the administrative burdens and business effects of
community rules in some selected policy areas, but owing to the political
sensitivities related to operations of this kind, these deregulation projects
98 It proves to be a bit of a hobby horse in the opinions of the – late - Advocate
General Geelhoed. Of the 9 references made to the IIA 1998 in European case law, 7
are of his doing. The IIA itself is never the object of litigation, nor an important
argument. See for an example Geelhoed’s opinion delivered on 26 January 2006 in
Case C-161/04 Republic of Austria v. European Parliament and Council of the
European Union.
99 Opinion of the Commission on the European Parliament’s amendments to the
Council’s common position regarding the proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the minimum health and safety requirements
regarding the exposure of workers to the risks arising from physical agents (optical
radiation). COM (2005) 526 final - COD 1992/0449 and Opinion No 7/2006 on a
proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending
Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 concerning investigations conducted by the
European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) OJ 2007 C 8, 12 January 2007 at 1.
100 The first French draft (Guide Pratique Commun) and later the English draft (Joint
Practical Guide) circulated since the year 2000 within the Commission and the EP.
In 2003 it was published in the other languages.
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have not produced many tangible results.101 A similar initiative, but
specifically aimed at reducing administrative burdens on enterprises, is the
Business Environment Simplification Taskforce (BEST), which was more or
less in line with the SLIM operation. The task force submitted its final
report to the Commission in May 1998. Although there were no direct and
tangible results in the field of deregulation of EU legislation, it was
successful in the sense that it revealed critical factors of deregulation. It
demonstrated the need for planning simplification and a long-range
simplification programme, the need for a dedicated legislative simplification
procedure, and a political, common and continuous sense of urgency to
simplify legislation.102
7.2 2002-2006: Better lawmaking
At the Lisbon Council in 2000 the European Union carved out an ambitious
strategic goal for the next decade. The EU wanted to become the most
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable
of sustainable economic growth, with more and better jobs and greater social
cohesion. The general feeling since the Lisbon Council is that European
legislation, as an important instrument for these targets, needs to be tuned to
this overall strategy. In its white paper on European governance of 2001, the
Commission conceded that the European Union needs to pay ‘constant
attention to improving the quality, effectiveness and simplicity of regulatory
acts.’103
Later that year the Commission wrote an interim report104 and issued
a Communication on Better Lawmaking, mapping out the strategy for the
three key elements of the new philosophy: simplifying and improving the
regulatory environment; promoting a culture of dialogue and participation
(i.e. furthering transparency, consultation, etc.); and the systemization of
impact assessment by the Commission.105 The Communication was
accompanied by an action plan ‘Simplifying and improving the regulatory
environment,’ detailing the responsibilities of the legislative institutions and
the actions required of them.106 Many elements have been enshrined in the
101 To quote a former Dutch Junior Minister (Benschop) ‘the SLIM operation as
such is useful, but, to date, it has produced insufficient actual results’. This was at
the time the common feeling. Kamerstukken II (Dutch Parliamentary Papers)
1998/1999 21 501-01, no. 123 at 2.
102 Commission Staff Working paper (2001) ‘Simpler Legislation for the Internal
Market’, preparing for a fifth phase, SEC (2001) at 575.
103 White paper on European Governance, above n. 4 at 20.
104 Interim-report Improving and Simplifying the Regulatory Environment, COM
(2001) 130 final.
105 Simplifying and improving the regulatory environment, COM (2001) 527 final.
106 COM (2001) 278 final.
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Interinstitutional agreement on Better Lawmaking of 2003 (IIA 2003).107
Better Lawmaking policy has left an impressive number of documents and
policies in its wake.108 We will not deal with them all but only discuss some
main features.
i. Simplification of the regulatory environment
Simplification is a big issue under the Better Lawmaking strategy.
The legislative stock is costly in the sense that it runs the risk of
overburdening citizens and economic actors in the EU
(compromising competitiveness, economic growth and sustainable
development), and it also consumes considerable funds for
translation. Therefore, and as a result of the Action Plan Better
Lawmaking, the Commission has stepped up the pace of
simplification in its Framework for Action ‘Updating and
Simplifying the Community Aqcuis’.109 This ongoing Action Plan
basically adopts a twofold approach. Firstly, it aims at a
simplification of the substance of secondary Community legislation
by continuous efforts to screen pending proposals, and by screening
policy sectors to identify simplification potential (and acting upon
it), mainstreaming this type of simplification screening, etc. The
second part of the Framework for Action strategy aims at reducing
the volume of the acquis by 25 per cent, 30,000 to 35,000 pages, by
codification,110 consolidation, and the removal of obsolete
legislation.111 The evaluation, ‘First progress report on the strategy
for the simplification of the regulatory environment,’112 reports that
the simplification part of the Action Plan is in full swing. The
Commission screened pending proposals in 2004 and withdrew 68,
and foresaw a further 10 withdrawals in 2007. The simplification of
existing legislation is also underway. From 2004 onward the
Commission has reinforced its efforts to modernise and simplify EU
legislation. Of the 100 originally planned proposals in the rolling
107 Interinstitutional Agreement on better law-making, OJ 2003 C 321 at 1.
108 See for the road that leads from better law making to Better regulation
<http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/index_en.htm> and <http://ec.
europa.eu/dgs/legal_service/law_making_en.htm> (last visited 23 June 2008).
109 COM (2004) 432 final.
110 At the EU level the process of codification is understood as a process whereby
different parts of law on a related subject are in some form or other integrated into a
single act. Codification involves adopting a new legal instrument, published in the
Official Journal (L series), which incorporates and repeals the instruments being
consolidated (basic instrument + amending instrument(s)) without altering their
substance.
111 Consolidation in fact is a sort of re-publication of pre-existing legislative texts.
112 COM (2006) 690 final.
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simplification programme 2005-2008,113 about 50 had been adopted
by the end of 2006. The Commission has now even beefed up its
rolling simplification programme with new proposals,114 even
opening up the possibility of simplification as the outcome of ex-
post evaluation of existing legislation. On a more critical note, the
Commission report concludes that simplification proposals need to
be given higher priority by the co-legislating institutions. The
codification and repeal of obsolete legislation should be prioritised
as well. More than 20 simplification proposals were pending in the
spring of 2008. Procedures to facilitate adoption of simplification
proposals should be considered, according to the Commission.
ii. Improvement of the regulatory environment
The improvement of the regulatory environment, another dimension
of Better Lawmaking, includes a host of instruments and actions.
The most topical ones, most of them enshrined in the IIA 2003,
involve:
 a better coordination of the legislative process115 by way of
improved information exchange, synchronization of action
between the various actors, multi-annual planning, programming
en progress reporting, etc.
 improved transparency and accessibility of the legislative
process.
Better planning, programming, and mutual exchange of
information do not only improve the efficiency of the interaction
between the European Council, the European Parliament and the
European Commission, but are also relevant to the citizen.
Transparency and better accessibility of legislation and
legislative processes is an important subject in the 2003
Agreement.116 Not only should European citizens gain greater
access to Community rules, they should also be able to gain a
better insight into the legislative processes preceding these rules.
117
 a balanced choice of legislative instrument and use of alternative
methods of regulation. Under the Better Lawmaking strategy,
113 COM (2005) 535.
114 First progress report on the strategy for the simplification of the regulatory
environment, COM (2006) 690.
115 Points 3 through 9 IIA 2003.
116 Points 10 and 11 IIA 2003
117 The Commission (through PreLex) and the European Parliament (through the
Legislative Observatory) will in the future ensure that citizens are able to see at a
single glance to what stage of the decision-making process a specific proposal for a
directive or regulation has proceeded and what documents are relevant.
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Community action in the form of legislation is perceived as a
last resort instrument. Regard for the principle of subsidiarity
requires soul searching as to the necessity and appropriateness
of Community action. Only when no alternative methods118
(self-regulation, agreements, co-regulation)119 of solution are
open, and only when it is strictly necessary and unavoidable, is
Community legislation to be considered. This policy of
reluctance has the beneficial side-effect that it could keep the
legislative stock in check, albeit potentially at the cost of
transparency and effective operation.
 improving the quality of legislation by adhering to the IIA 1998,
open and extensive pre-legislative consultation and an integrated
impact analysis on the part of the Commission on legislative
proposals: an ex ante evaluation of the estimated social,
economic and environmental impact of the proposes legislation.
This assessment can be communicated to co-legislators like the
European Parliament and the Council, and even to the general
public, to enable evidence-based rule-making. Due attention to
consistency of text is the last measure to improve quality.
 better transposition and application. Even though member states
tend to complain that the time limits for the transposition of
directives are too tight, the IIA of 2003 agreement calls on the
institutions to use time limits in directives that are as short as
possible and that generally do not exceed two years. Further, an
attempt has been made through a ‘pillory effect’ to urge the
member states to transpose legislation at an even faster pace. A
Commission scoreboard and annual reports with tables show the
member states’ transposition record.
iii Consultation
Consultation is of prime importance for the quality of legislation.
This is true not only from the viewpoint of due consideration of the
relevant interests (and so the enhancement of input legitimacy) but
also from the viewpoint of careful preparation of proposals. As a
part of the Better Lawmaking strategy, the Commission established a
set of minimum standards, procedures and techniques for external
118 See points 16 through 23 IIA 2003.
119 I.e. the mechanism whereby a Community legislative act entrusts the attainment
of the objectives defined by the legislative authority to parties which are recognized
in the field (such as economic operators, the social partners, non-governmental
organizations, or associations (see point 17 IA 2003).
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consultations in 2002.120 According to these standards attention
needs to be paid to providing clear consultation documents,
consulting all relevant target groups, leaving sufficient time for
participation, publishing results and providing feedback. The
standards provide a common framework for the operation of
consultation, to ensure that they are carried out in a transparent and
coherent way throughout the Commission.
Obradovic and Alonso Vizcaino are critical about the new
common framework. They feel this framework signals the end of the
era of the open access policy for interest associations wanting to
partake in Community decision making.121 Where the Commission
has hitherto held that interest representation should be based on
principles of good governance, like representativeness,
accountability and transparency, the present consultation standards
do not provide sufficient operational basis to meet these
principles.122
iv Systematization of impact assessment
In 2003 the Commission introduced a system of integral Impact
Assessment (IA), replacing and integrating all existing sector
assessments of direct and indirect impacts of proposed measures.
When IA was introduced in 2003, it required all items included in
the Commission’s Legislative and Work Programme (CLWP) to
undergo a Preliminary Impact Assessment (PIA). Based on the PIA,
the College of Commissioners decided whether an Extended Impact
Assessment (ExIA) was necessary. This didn’t work all that well and
a number of aspects were revised in 2005.
The Commission decided that initiatives set out in its
Legislative and Work Programme 2005 – key legislative proposals
as well as the most important cross-cutting policy-defining non-
legislative proposals – should all be subject to an integral impact
assessment.123 The distinction between PIAs and ExIAs was
abolished. Roadmaps replaced PIAs, and a full IA is now required
for all items in the CLWP.
The methods, too, were refined. By 2005, guidelines on IA
120 See the Commission’s Communication Towards a reinforced culture of
consultation and dialogue - General principles and minimum standards for
consultation of interested parties by the Commission, COM (2002) 704 final.
121 D. Obradovic and J.M. Alonso Vizcaino, ‘Good Governance Requirements
Concerning the Participation of Interest Groups in EU Consultations’ (2006) 43
Common Market Law Review 1049, especially at 1083-1084.
122 Id., at 1084.
123 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament, Better regulation for Growth and Jobs in the European Union, SEC
(2005) 175 COM (2005) 97 final.
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had been published, detailing the procedural rules and analytical
steps in IA, which were updated in March 2006, to integrate, inter
alia, the Inter-Institutional Common Approach to IA, which clarified
the roles of the three EU Institutions with regard to IA. One element
of this common approach consists of a mutually agreed method for
measuring administrative costs (the EU Standard Cost Method).124
The Commission also established an Impact Assessment Board in
2006, which primarily has a quality-control and support function.
The IA system was evaluated in 2006 and 2007.125 The
overall conclusion was that it is still difficult to tell whether IA is a
success, as the system is still in an early stage of its evolution.126 In
terms of quantity, IA is serious business: as of November 2008,
already more than 230 impact assessments have been carried out. In
terms of quality the evaluation shows that the more IAs are
understood and conducted as a genuine, objective and open
analytical exercise, the higher their potential to lead to better
informed and therefore higher quality proposals.127 However, the
preconditions are not always in place for such an exercise, due to an
inappropriate approach or insufficient tools, expertise, time and
resources. The quality of the IAs was found to vary, and the use of
IAs by the Council and European Parliament was sometimes found
to be hampered by internal factors (working culture, available
capacity) within these institutions. IA is successful in terms of a
growing cultural change in the Commission services, internal and
external openness and transparency of the policy, development
process, improved coordination within the Commission, the
consultation aspects and more quantification and better quality
analysis of proposals. The establishment of the Impact Assessment
Board is believed to be a step forward for the quality of IAs.128 The
bureau concludes that there is room for improvement regarding the
scope of application, elements of analysis, timing and approach,
quality control and support and guidance. All in all, those are not
bad marks for a four-year-old system. The system seems to be here
124 Council document 14901/05 of 24 November 2005; Parliament endorsed the
Common approach as the last of the three institutions in July 2006.
125 Evaluation Partnership Limited, Evaluation of the Commission’s Impact
Assessment System (2007) Final report.
126 Meuwese more or less comes to the same conclusion. See A.C.M. Meuwese,
Impact assessment in EU Lawmaking, PhD-thesis Leiden University (Alphen aan
den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2008).
127 See Evaluation Partnership, above n. 125 at 5.
128 See Information note from the President to the Commission ‘Better regulation
and enhanced Impact Assessment’ 28 June 2007 SEC (2007) 926 OJ 1795 – point
16.1.
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to stay, somewhat enhanced maybe, but largely unchanged.129
7.3 Since 2005 – stepping up Better Lawmaking to Better Regulation
In November 2007 the European Commission stepped up the Better
Lawmaking programme, launching the Better Regulation strategy.
Better regulation is a broad strategy to improve the regulatory environment in
Europe – containing a range of initiatives to consolidate, codify and simplify
existing legislation and improve the quality of new legislation by better evaluating
its likely economic, social and environmental impacts,
so the communication tells us.130 Basically this is the same concept as held in
the Better Lawmaking project but with an economic twist. The reason for
this change of course is obvious: the failed European Constitution. The
process resulted in the perception that EU lawmaking is in need of more
legitimacy. This perception combined with the need to redirect the
governance strategy from 2001 – which, to a certain extent, relied on the
Constitutional arrangements and instruments – seem to be the underlying
motives for Better Regulation. On the face of it, though, Better Regulation is
just another denomination for Better Lawmaking.
Meuwese maintains that Better Regulation differs from Better
Lawmaking in that it is made a political priority and explicitly linked the
(output) legitimacy of EU lawmaking. Better Regulation further
distinguishes itself by taking into account specific conditions of EU
lawmaking, culminating in the formalization of the inter-institutional
dimension of regulatory reform.131 Whatever the case, the distinction is not
all that clear-cut. The ‘Better Regulation’ label does, however, tie in better
with the name of similar projects in the member states and OECD ‘lingo’.
The Better Regulation strategy that has emerged since 2005
comprises the following highlights:
 an updated simplification programme, aimed at generating tangible
economic benefits (particularly by reducing administrative burdens)
 a reinforced scrutiny of impact assessments through the creation of an
independent Impact Assessment Board under the authority of the
President
 strengthening the enforcement of Community law
129 See C. Day, Secretary General of the European Commission, Enhancing Impact
Assessment, speech of 28 June 2007 <http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/docs/
key_docs/speech_cd_rev2.pdf.>
130 Communication from the Commission A strategic review of Better regulation in
the European Union COM (2006) 689 final.
131 See Meuwese, above n. 126 at 22.
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 more systematic impact assessments of major amendments to
Commission proposals
 high priority to pending simplification proposals, to codification and to
repeal of obsolete legislation
 development and enforcement of consultation mechanisms, where
missing
 improved application of Community law.
The update of simplification, announced in the Better Regulation
Strategy, was already underway. In October 2005, following the
Commission communication on ‘Better Regulation for Growth and Jobs in
the EU’,132 the Commission launched a new phase for the simplification of
existing EU law by setting out a rolling programme, initially covering the
years 2005-2008.133 It lists some 100 initiatives affecting some 220 basic
legislative acts. It was updated for the period 2006-2009,134 adding another
43 initiatives to the programme. In parallel, on the basis of a detailed
programme covering more than 400 legislative acts, the Commission intends
to codify the body of European legislation (acquis) by 2008.
A new element in the strategy is the reduction of administrative
burden. To this end, an Action plan was published in 2007,135 laying down a
programme to reduce the administrative burdens, primarily caused by
information provisions in legislation, by 25 % in 2012.
Another stone in the hail of Better Regulation priorities is that of the
improvement of application of Community law. In September 2007 the
Commission issued a Communication outlining its policy in this field.136 The
Commission plans to deal with poor application of Community legislation in
four different ways: by prevention (giving increased attention to
implementation throughout the policy cycle); by an efficient and effective
response to poor application (with improved information exchange and
problem-solving); by the improvement of internal working methods
(prioritisation and acceleration in infringements management of the
Commission itself); and finally by enhancing dialogue and transparency
between the European institutions and improving information for the public.
132 COM (2005) 97.
133 Communication of the Commission, Implementing the Community Lisbon
programme: A strategy for the simplification of the regulatory environment, COM
(2005) 535.
134 Communication from the ‘A strategic review of Better regulation in the European
Union’, COM (2006) 690 final, COM (2006) 691 final.
135 Communication of the Commission, Action Programme for Reducing
Administrative Burdens in the European Union, COM (2007) 23.
136 Communication of the Commission, A Europe of results – Applying Community
Law, above n. 56.
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8 Evaluation
If poor quality of EU legislation is the ailment, one cannot say that there
isn’t any medicine around. The last decade has shown a remarkable increase
in awareness of the problems and insights in consequences of defective
legislation, as well as a sense of urgency for ‘Better Lawmaking’. But does
the medicine cure or prevent the disease, and is it properly dosed?
This is a hard question to answer, not only because Better
lawmaking (or Better Regulation) policies are fairly new and have not yet
been fully evaluated, but also because any appraisal of these policies
depends, as we have seen, on a perception of the basic functions attributed to
legislative instruments and the standards derived from it. Debate, academic
or otherwise, on the standards for ‘good’ legislation and its theoretical
underpinnings is scarce in the EU. Different visions regarding the quality of
EU legislation and the proper standards seem to have piled up in the present
quality policies.137 The EU’s Better Lawmaking initiative (2002-2006) – its
standards and policies – seems to reflect and emphasise the constitutional,
democratic, bureaucratic and instrumental functions of EU legislation,
whereas the Better Regulation initiative (2006-…) seems to favour the
instrumental and political functions.138 In the current Better Regulation
strategy, however, strands of both perceptions, and the standards resulting
from it, are still present. This leads to the paradoxical situation in which the
Better Regulation strategy aims to improve the interventionist performance
of legislation, a lot of the legislative standards reflect the constitutional,
democratic and bureaucratic functions of legislation. Although admittedly
there is some relation between standards and aim, this can lead to
indetermination or even confusion about the objectives of the quality
policies, and in the long run and hamper the effect thereof. The demarcation
line between Better Lawmaking and Better Regulation was not drawn very
precisely in 2006. It would be a good idea to clarify the issue here, if we
want to see whether the regulatory policies are yielding result.
Baldwin, for one, has argued that there are no easy routes to
regulatory improvement, and we feel he is right.139 Not only is Better
Lawmaking difficult, its success or failure is notoriously hard to review and
137 De Francesco and Radaelli label this ‘the proliferation of objectives and goals of
the regulatory reform’ after the Lisbon Agenda (including competitiveness, the
completion of the single markets and the participatory-transparent government). F.
De Francesco and C.M. Radaelli, ‘Indicators of regulatory quality’, in C. Kirkpatrick
and D. Parker (eds.) Regulatory Impact Assessment; Towards Better Regulation?
(Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar Publishing 2007) 50.
138 See A.J. Harcourt and C.M. Radaelli, ‘The limits to EU technocratic legislation’
(1995) 35 European Journal of Political Research 107 at 109.
139 See Baldwin, above n. 91 at 511.
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assess. First of all there is the problem of the yardstick. What are the right
standards for legislation, what is the right scale? From a Better Regulation
perspective one may want to take a set of economic scales and try to
calculate whether legislation strikes the right balance when it comes to
minimizing costs (e.g. not creating any more burdens than is strictly
necessary) and maximizing benefits (increasing productivity, employment,
etc.). The benefits, however, may prove hard to calculate. Especially if we
consider that European legislation also creates trust, security, legal
protection and all kinds of other, more or less imponderable, benefits for the
internal market, the ‘pricing’ of pros and cons may prove to be extremely
difficult. In the update of the project ‘Governance Matters 2007’ the World
Bank presents an impressive set of data on the scoring rate of 212 countries
and regions on six dimensions of governance between 1996 and 2006.140
One of these dimensions is ‘regulatory quality’, which breaks up into over
25 indicators for quality.141 Based on these indicators, different groups and
organisations were asked questions about the way legislation impedes,
permits and promotes economic life in a country or region (Does the
exchange rate policy hinder the competitiveness of firms? Is it easy to start a
business? etc.). These data are compared with statistics on economic (and
other types of) performance, giving an overall score on regulatory quality
over a course of ten years. This allows a review on a countries performance
over the years or a comparison to other countries. But does it really tell us
something about regulatory quality and can it be used to judge the
effectiveness of Better regulation policies?142
If we examine the data more closely we will see that performance
indicators and outcomes do not calculate the effect of legislation to
economic life as such, but merely estimate the risks of some regulatory
impediments and the effect of laws directly pertaining to the economy, like
business, tax and financial law. The quality of traffic regulations or human
rights in a country, for instance, is not considered separately in this project.
Traffic regulations and human rights, however, do form an inextricable part
of a country’s legal system but it is difficult to assess what their particular
contribution to the quality of other legislation is, or to the overall legal
framework. As of yet they may prove imponderable, which can blur the total
assessment of the regulatory quality of other, more measurable domains of
law. Regulatory quality assessment may be prone to a measurability myopia
with a bias to the quality and effects of legislation that does not directly
pertain to or affect economic life.
Even if we were to take a somewhat more general, utilitarian
140 See <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/home.htm> (last visited 18
January 2008).
141 See Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzii, above n. 29 at 68 ff.
142 See also Radaelli and De Francesco, above n. 30 at 48.
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approach, it would remain difficult to find a quantitative net result of Better
Lawmaking efforts in terms of impact or success of the measures on the
overall quality of the legislation. The legislative standards themselves
seemingly resist an objective calculation of success: What is the right
measure for proportionality, what are the degrees of legality and drafting
quality of a directive, what the right benchmarks?
It may even be undesirable to assess legislation and policies to
improve them in this way. In his latest book, Tamanaha argues that a one-
sided instrumental use and perception of law, one-sided debates on law as a
mere means to an end, can threaten the very idea of legality itself.143 Mere
instrumentalism may in the end undermine important social and symbolic
functions pertaining to legislation.
Regulatory quality and legislative quality are, as we have seen,
different concepts, expressing and highlighting different functions of
legislation. Where regulatory quality is about the extent to which legislation,
as an instrument of public policy, permits and promotes ‘private sector
development’, legislative quality is about the ability of legislation to express
law. Improving legislative quality may require a different approach than the
improvement of regulatory quality. Sometimes these objectives may even
run counter or prove incompatible.
Does that mean there is no way of assessing the success of EU
Better Lawmaking policies? On the contrary, we believe there is. First, one
can take a more procedural point of view to the assessment: Have the
relevant procedures been complied with, have the programme targets been
met, is the message hitting home and are the actors satisfied with the result?
One may also take the level of embeddedness as a success indicator.
Seen through that lens, EU Better Lawmaking and Better Regulation
policies seem to be making some progress. Impact assessment seems to be
well under way, the simplification programmes are yielding result,
consultation is under control and the awareness for the need of Better
Lawmaking seems to have caught on. Although the proper application and
implementation of some (drafting) rules144 and instruments145 and the
coordination of Better Lawmaking efforts between the institutions probably
still leaves something to be desired, on the whole Better Lawmaking
143 See Tamanaha , above n. 21 at 227.
144 Based upon her assessment of the drafting quality of EC legislation in 2001,
Xanthaki argued that lacking quality of EC legislation was not as much the result of
the lack of dedicated policy and instruments (criteria, manuals, drafting and such),
but rather more the result of poor application of these instruments. Xanthaki, above
n. 13 at 675.
145 See Meuwese e.g. observes that the Austrian handbook for Strategic
Environmental Assessment is still hardly implemented at all. Meuwese, above n.
126 at 259.
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agreements seem to be abided by.
Another perspective on the result has more of a constitutional nature.
One may assess Better Lawmaking policies by the level in which they
express, enshrine and safeguard the relevant standards for legislative quality.
In this respect, too, progress has been made. If we take the IIAs of 1998 and
2003 we can see that, after a modest start in 1992 and again in 2003,
essential legislative quality standards (as we read them from the treaties and
the common cultures of the member states) have been enshrined in binding
documents.
In a somewhat more provocative way Better Lawmaking can also be
seen as a source of EU constitutional law. Better Lawmaking policies
provide instruments (the interinstitutional agreements, for instance) that lie
down binding law on EU Lawmaking, but are not held within the EU treaties
themselves (which contain the bulk of the EU’s constitutional law). Some of
the Better Lawmaking policies even coincide with some of the rules and
tools required by the 2000 governance strategy, which the failed European
Constitution could not deliver. The proper norm on the use of EC directives
under the IIA 2003 and the Consultation strategy is but one of the few
examples for that. It is not all that uncommon to take the view of Better
lawmaking policies as an expression and source of constitutional law. In her
PhD thesis, Anne Meuwese demonstrates that in some respects IA can
function as a catalyst of legal principles (launching them in the political
debate more prominently), act as a constraint to legislative processes (by the
power of its present self-evidence it disciplines the legislative actors), and
act as a platform for constitutional discourse and a source for soft
constitutional law as well. Especially some of the interinstitutional
agreements on Better Lawmaking are constitutional in character, especially
where they function as the ‘laws of lawmaking’.146
The ultimate test for Better Lawmaking will, of course, be the
political appraisal of the outcome of the policies. Better Regulation and
Better Lawmaking policies are essentially political programmes resting on
political perceptions as to the overriding values of legislation in a market
economy. This does not mean that the political assessment of the success is
purely subjective or unstructured. It only means that in the end the effect and
success of Better Lawmaking can only be weighed politically. On that note,
in March 2007 the European Council acknowledged that 2006 had seen good
progress towards improving the regulatory environment and underlined that
further efforts on the simplification programmes and reduction of
administrative costs were required in order to consolidate and build on
achievements so far. With a view to the Strategic Review of Better
146 See I. Eiselt and P. Slominski, ‘Sub-Constitutional Engineering: Negotiation,
Content, and Legal Value of Interinstitutional Agreements in the EU’ (2006) 12
European Law Journal 2 209.
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regulation, in the spring of 2008 the Commission was considering an
evaluation strategy to the Better Regulation initiatives, possibly including
the establishment of a group of independent experts to advise the institutions
on their work towards Better Regulation. We feel that on the occasion of the
evaluation it is important to pay due attention not only to regulatory quality
but to legislative quality as well. And especially to the difference between
the two, for the improvement of legislative quality does not automatically
entail the improvement of regulatory quality.
